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Many western industrialized countries face strong budgetary pressures due to the aging of the baby
boom generations and the general trends toward earlier ages of retirement. We use the American PSID
and the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to explain differences in prevalence and dynamics
of self-reported work disability and labor force status. To that end we specify a two-equation dynamic
panel data model describing the dynamics of labor force status and self-reported work disability. When
we apply the U.S. parameters to the equations for the thirteen European countries we consider, the
result is generally that work disability is lower and employment is higher. Furthermore, measures of
employment protection across the different countries suggest that increased employment protection
reduces reentry into the labor force and hence is a major factor explaining employment differences
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1. Introduction 
Increasing labor force participation among older workers is an important issue on 
the scientific and policy agenda in the U.S. and other industrialized countries. Major 
categories of individuals who are out of the labor force at later ages consist of persons 
drawing disability benefits, unemployment benefits, and early retirement benefits. Cross-
country differences in the prevalence of early retirement are clearly related to differences 
in financial incentives (Gruber and Wise, 2003, Börsch-Supan, 2007). The fraction of 
workers on disability insurance is vastly different across countries with similar levels of 
economic development and comparable access to modern medical technology and 
treatment. 
Health is also a major determinant of economic inactivity, and those who have a 
health problem that limits them in their daily activities or in the amount or kind of work 
they can do (a “work disability”) are much less likely to work for pay than others 
(Stapleton and Burkhauser, 2003). In view of the aging of the work force in developed 
countries, reducing work disability among the working population and particularly 
among older workers may have a major impact on the sustainability of social security and 
health care systems, among other things. Institutional differences in eligibility rules, 
workplace accommodation of older or sick workers, or generosity of benefits, contribute 
to explaining the differences in disability rolls (cf., e.g., Bound and Burkhauser, 1999, 
Autor and Duggan, 2003, and Börsch-Supan, 2007). Recent survey data show, however, 
that significant differences between countries are also found in self-reports of work 
limiting disabilities and general health (Banks et al. 2007).  
In this paper we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to study the labor force dynamics in 
the U.S. and in thirteen European countries. To focus on labor market dynamics in the 
pre-retirement years and because these dynamics are likely to differ by gender, we 
concentrate on the age group between 40 and 65 and consider males and females 
separately. We also investigate the dynamics of work disability (i.e. the extent to which 
work disability varies over time and its reversibility) and how this varies across countries. 
One of the questions we address is whether we can explain the prevalence of self-  4
reported work disability as a function of individual characteristics, including general 
health.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the details of the 
data that are used are described. Section 3 discusses some pertinent characteristics of 
institutions in Europe and the U.S. that relate especially to the incentives and institutions 
of work disability programs.  Section 4 presents the model that is used to describe labor 
force dynamics in the various countries. The model is estimated for each country 
separately. Section 5 presents the estimation results. In Section 6, we summarize the 
implications of these results by showing simulations, where we assign U.S. parameter 
values to the models for the European countries. The implied differences in outcomes can 
be seen as a counterfactual simulation of the impact U.S. policies and institutions would 
have when implemented in European countries. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
Our data come from two sources: the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Both data sets have reasonably 
comparable measures of labor force activity and self-assessed work disability for the 
countries that will be included in our analysis. We discuss some issues related to the 
comparability of measurement of these key concepts in section 5 below. 
The ECHP is an annual longitudinal survey of households in the EU.
1 Data were 
collected by national statistical agencies under the supervision and coordination of 
Eurostat (the statistical office of the EU). Table A1, taken from Eurostat (2003, p.15), 
gives an overview of the waves of ECHP in all fifteen countries that participated in the 
ECHP project.  
The ECHP started in 1994 and was terminated in 2001. The first wave covered 
some 60,500 households and some 130,000 adults aged 16 and above from all countries 
except Austria, Finland and Sweden. Austria and Finland were added in the second and 
third waves. As of the fourth wave, the original ECHP survey was terminated in 
Germany, Luxembourg and the UK. Comparable data for these countries were obtained 
from existing national panels. For the UK this was the British Household Panel Survey 
                                                 
1 See Nicoletti and Peracchi (2002) and Peracchi (2002) for more information on ECHP.    5
(BHPS), for Germany the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and for Luxembourg the 
PSELL (Panel socio-économique Liewen zu Lëtzebuerg). For these countries we will use 
the existing national panels rather than the few waves of the ECHP. As of the 4
th wave, 
data for Sweden were obtained from the Swedish Living Conditions Survey. Since this is 
not a panel, we will exclude Sweden from our analysis. We will also not use the 
Luxembourg data, since it provides no information on self-reported disability. 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has gathered almost 30 years of 
extensive economic and demographic data on a nationally representative sample of 
approximately 5000 (original) families and 35,000 individuals who live in these families.  
Details on labor market activity and family income and its components have been 
gathered in each wave since the inception of PSID in 1968.  The PSID has been 
collecting information on self-reported general health status (the standard five-point scale 
from excellent to poor) since 1984 and has always collected good information on work-
related disabilities.  To provide comparability in the time period with the EHCP, our 
analysis will use the PSID waves between 1995 and 2003. It should be noted that after 




There exists great variation in labor market institutions across OECD countries; 
regulations with respect to disability insurance are certainly no exception. To get a very 
broad overview for a majority of countries in our sample, Figure 1 reports a crude 
measure of the generosity of disability benefits – the fraction of GDP accounted for by 
public expenditures on disability benefits. Considerable variation across OECD countries 
is readily apparent, with France and Italy spending less than 1% of GDP and three 
countries – Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands – spending more than twice that level. 
Using this metric, the U.S. ranks lower than any of the OECD countries listed in Figure 1. 
The variation spending levels can of course be due to variation in benefit levels or 
variation in eligibility, or some combination of both. 
Looking more deeply into international variation than the simple generosity 
measure presented above, various dimensions can be distinguished. The main ones are 
the loss of earnings capacity required to qualify for benefits and the way in which such   6
loss of earnings capacity is assessed, eligibility requirements based on work or 
contribution history, and benefit levels in relation to loss of earnings capacity. Table A2 
provides an overview of the main features of disability insurance systems in the countries 
we study in this paper.  
 
Figure 1: Public Expenditure on disability benefits














Per cent of GDP (1999)
Source: OECD (2003b), Chapter 2. 
 
Table A2 illustrates the complexity of these disability programs across countries. 
For example, while many countries have a basic five years minimum period of eligibility 
(for example, Germany, Austria, Italy, Portugal), basic eligibility is as low as six months 
in Belgium and one year in France while one is not fully covered unless one has worked 
for ten years in the United States.  Similarly, while the loss of normal earnings capacity is 
sufficient to qualify for eligibility in Spain, one must have a loss of two-thirds of earnings 
capacity in France, Belgium, and Portugal.   7
Not surprisingly, the variation in DI systems identified in Table A2 is correlated 
with differences in prevalence of DI receipt across countries and in the disability status of 
individuals receiving DI. Börsch-Supan (2007) showed that in a cross-sectional context 
variation in incentives and institutional rules across a series of European countries and 
the United States can account for differences across these countries in the fractions of 
individuals on work disability programs. In contrast, variation in demographic attributes 
and health across these countries did little to explain these differences. 
In this paper, we do not attempt to analyze being on the disability rolls but instead 
aim at explaining the cross-sectional and dynamic variation across countries in self-
assessed work disability and work.  Table 1 shows for 2001 the relation between what is 
probably the best single measure of the scope of a country’s disability program, the 
fraction of disability benefits as a fraction of GDP, and the fraction of men who self-
report that they have a work disability.
2 There appears to be almost no correlation 
between these two measures. 
Table 1: Expenditures on Disability Insurance and Self-reported male work 
disability, 2001 
   DI expenditure as a % of 
GDP 
Self-reported male work disability, 40-65, 
2001 (%) 
Germany  1.6 40.3 
Denmark  2.7 22.0 
Netherlands  4 24.5 
Belgium  2.2 14.3 
France  1.7 20.5 
UK  2.2 13.1 
Ireland  1.3 15.7 
Italy  2 8.0 
Greece  1.6 13.3 
Spain  2.3 15.5 
Portugal  2.4 22.9 
Austria  2.3 17.8 
Finland  3.1 29.0 
U.S.  1.1 19.3  
Source: DI expenditures: “Social Safety Nets in the OECD countries”, Worldbank, Social 
  Safety Net Primer Notes, (25), 2006.; Self-reported male disability: ECHP and PSID data   
used in this paper; unbalanced panels, weighted.
  
                                                 
2 The exact question on work disability in ECHP is: “Are you hampered in your daily activities by any 
physical or mental health problem, illness or disability?” In the PSID, it is: “Do you have any physical or 
nervous condition that limits the type of work or the amount of work you can do?”   8
 
 
Although the incentives and institutions across countries appear to have a great deal to do 
with the fraction of workers who are on disability programs, these incentives and 
institutions appear to be only weakly related to the fraction of men who claim that they 
are work disabled. 
Table A3, taken from a recent OECD study, provides information on some 
characteristics of DI recipients for most of the countries we are considering in this paper. 
The first column shows that a substantial fraction of the people on DI declare that they 
have no work disability. This fraction varies a lot across countries and is particularly 
large in Sweden (48.9%) and the U.S. (46.7%). Either people are granted DI benefits 
while not acknowledging disability status, or those who recover from their disability are 
not able to find a job and instead stay on DI, or some combination of both. The third 
column of Table A3 shows indeed that exit rates from DI are extremely low. The UK and 
the Netherlands seem to be the exceptions in this respect, but this might have to do with 
reforms in the disability insurance system in these countries. 
The second column of Table A3 shows the other side of the coin – many people 
who report to have a (moderate or severe) work disability receive neither earnings nor DI 
or other benefits. Again, variation across countries is substantial. In Sweden, almost 
everyone with a work disability has earnings from work or receives benefits, but in Spain 
and Italy, 28 or 29% receive neither of the two. The U.S. has an intermediate position in 
this respect. 
Column 4 shows that the expected negative relation between disability and the 
chances of being employed holds in all countries: the relative employment rate is always 
less than one. Still, there are substantial differences across countries. In Spain, someone 
with a work disability is 0.41 times as likely to do paid work as someone without a work 
disability, compared to 0.79 in Switzerland. Again, the U.S. is somewhere in the middle 
with 0.58. Column 5 shows that there is an earnings differential between workers with 
and without a work disability, but in most countries, it is not very large. Here the U.S.   9
and (surprisingly) Sweden are the exceptions – with workers with a disability earning 
almost 30% less than workers without disability.
3  
On the other hand, for those with a work disability, working seems to be an 
effective way of increasing income, as is borne out by column 6. This is particularly true 
in the U.S., where the disabled who work have an average income that is 2.84 times as 
high as the average income of disabled who do not work. In Europe, the differences are 
smaller, but even in Sweden and Denmark, the countries with the lowest income 
differentials between working and non-working disabled persons, the difference is still 37 
or 38%. These cross-country differences seem to be in line with the generosity of 
disability insurance systems (as indicated by Figure 1, for example).   
 
 
4. The Model 
 
In this section, we outline our model of the interrelated dynamics of self-reported 
work disability and labor force status (work versus no work). The equation for disability 
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     (1) 
Here  it D  indicates the presence of self-reported work disability; 0 means no 
disability and 1 means disability. Lagged labor force status is denoted by an indicator 
variable  ,1 1 it W − =  if the respondent worked in the previous period and  ,1 0 it W − =  
otherwise. The error terms 
D
it ε  are assumed to be independent standard normal; 
D
i α is an 
individual effect, normally distributed with variance
2
α σ . The
D
it ε  and 
D
i α  are assumed 
mutually independent and independent of the vector of explanatory variables it X . 
Thus there are two direct sources of persistence in the disability equation: the 
lagged dependent variable  ,1 it D −  and the unobserved heterogeneity term
D
i α . We allow for 
a lagged effect of work force status on work disability, but not for a contemporaneous 
effect. That is, we are effectively assuming no contemporaneous ‘justification bias’ in 
                                                 
3 A complete analysis of this effect would need to account additionally for differential selection into the 
labor market across countries.    10
self-reported disability (justification bias would imply that people say they have a work 
disability to justify their non-work status). 
The second equation explains whether respondents do paid work or not. Labor 




WW W W WW
it it D i t W i t d i t i it
it it
WX D W D
WW
β γγδ α ε −− =+ + ++ +
=>
   (2) 
Thus we allow for both a contemporaneous and a lagged effect of work disability 
on labor force status. The assumptions about individual effects and error terms are the 
same as before. We do not allow for correlation between the error terms in the two 
equations, but we do allow for correlated individual effects. Also here, there are two 
direct sources of persistence, lagged labor force status  ,1 it W − and the individual effect 
W
i α . 
The variance-covariance matrix of the individual effects is unrestricted. For 
estimation purposes we parameterize it as follows. Let  2 (,) ~ ( 0 , )
DW
ii i uu u NI = . Then we 
specify the vector of individual effects  (,)
D W












a lower triangular matrix. The parameter estimates summarized in the next section 
include the estimates of the entries inΛ.  
To account for the initial conditions problem, we follow Heckman (1981), Hyslop 
(1999), and Vella and Verbeek (1999) and specify separate equations for wave 1. These 
equations have the same exogenous regressors and contemporaneous dependent variables 
on the right hand side as the dynamic equations presented above, but do not include the 
lagged dependent variables. No restrictions are imposed on the coefficients or their 
relation to the coefficients in the dynamic equations. These coefficients are estimated 
jointly with the parameters in the dynamic equations and can be seen as nuisance 
parameters.  
In the initial condition equations, we include arbitrary linear combinations of the 
individual effects in the two dynamic equations. This is the same as including an arbitrary 
linear combination of the two entries in i u . The estimated coefficients of these linear 
combinations can be seen as nuisance parameters.     11
The above equations must be slightly adapted for the PSID data. In the PSID, the 
frequency of interviewing was reduced from once a year to once every two years starting 
in 1997.
4 As a result, for the more recent years a lagged variable in the PSID model refers 
to a value two years ago. Hence in the model for the PSID data we include separate 
coefficients for the lagged variables for the case that the previous wave is one year ago 






Our focus in this research is on the dynamics of disability and labor force activity 
during the pre-retirement years. These labor market dynamics are likely to be very 
different than those that characterize the period of labor market entry when people are 
first entering the labor market. Therefore, we estimate our models on samples of people 
who are ages forty and over. Separate models are estimated for men and women given 
that the dynamics of labor force behavior are potentially very different. 
 A problem that requires special attention in an exercise like this is the 
international comparability of variable definitions. For example, if schools are organized 
in very different ways in different countries (as they are), it would be very difficult to 
know what it would mean to make comparisons across countries that ‘assume’ that the 
schooling levels of workers are the same.  
For that reason we have only used a very limited set of covariates: age dummies 
for the age groups 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64; year dummies; marital status 
(married or not, where married includes cohabitation) and two health dummies.  
International comparability of self reported health is a very difficult problem in 
itself.  Because of this, we have adopted the following simple approach: In the U.S. and 
European data respectively we find the weighted frequency distributions for ages 40-65 
(balanced panel) in the top panel of Table 2. Based on this we collapse the five categories 
into three; combining the first two and the last two, essentially ignoring the wording 
                                                 
4 To be precise, we use PSID waves 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003. 
5 To be precise, for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, only the one year lags are included; for the years 1999, 
2001, and 2003, only the two year lags are included.   12
differences. This leads to the distribution of self-reported health in the bottom panel of 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Self-reported health in the PSID and the ECHP data 
Original Classification 
U.S. E.U. 
Excellent 21.3%  Very  good  16.2% 
Very good  26.6%  Good  43.4% 
Good 29.5%  Fair  29.8% 
Fair 10.1%  Bad 8.6% 
Poor 2.5% Very  bad  2.0% 
Combined Classification 
U.S. E.U. 
Excellent 57.8  Excellent  59.6 
Good 29.5  Good  29.8 
Fair 12.7  Fair  10.6 
 
The health distribution is now similar in the U.S. and the European countries. In the 
analysis section below, we discuss what the implications for work disability and labor 
market participation would be if health were ‘the same’ in all countries.  
Table A4 summarizes for men and women separately some of the key dynamic 
parameters (relating disability and work) estimated from our empirical models. While 
there are differences between our estimates for men and women, these tend to be 
concentrated in the ‘off-diagonal’ terms – the effects of disability on work status or vice 
versa. In most countries (but not all), the effects of lagged disability on current disability 
is similar for men and women within each country.  To the extent that the effect of lagged 
disability on current disability measures the pure transitions of work related health 
between the waves, the similarity between men and women may not be that surprising. In 
most countries, the effects of lagged employment on current employment are higher for 
men than for women.  The traditionally more transitory nature of employment for women 
would imply a smaller estimated impact of lagged employment.      13
With the exception of Belgium and Finland, the estimated effects of disability on 
employment are somewhat larger (in absolute value) for men than for women. Disability 
programs whose generosity depends on a past series of contributions would imply greater 
generosity for men compared to women and this is what we find. Finally, the effects of 
lagged employment on disability may reflect in part the health effects of work. More 
likely this is picking up the unobserved effects of health, which is very incompletely 
captured in this data.  Better health increases the likelihood of work and makes disability 
less likely.  
Both disability and work status are highly persistent, and significantly so, across 
all countries. Current disability is negatively associated with current work status in most 
countries, and the relationship is particularly strong in the U.S. (and for women in 
Belgium). The evidence for lagged disability affecting current work status over and 
above the contemporaneous effect is weaker. There is evidence of lagged employment 
status affecting current work disability however.   
As one would probably expect, the parameter estimates for the effects of lagged 
work status on current work status tend to be relatively low in the U.S., reflecting a 
higher turnover than in the European countries (both from working to not working and 
from not working to working). At the low end of the European scale in this respect are 






To gain a better understanding of the differences between the countries, we carry 
out four simulations. The first simulation simply generates values of work and self-
reported disability over the sample period in each country, using the estimated models. 
The second simulation replaces the country specific parameter estimates for the disability 
equation by the corresponding U.S. coefficients, but retains the own country work 
parameters. Conversely, the third simulation replaces the country specific parameter 
estimates of the work equation by U.S. coefficients, but retains the own country disability 
equation. Finally, the fourth simulation replaces the country specific parameters in both   14
equations by U.S. coefficients. In all simulations the initial conditions are generated 
according to the country specific estimates.  
The figures in Appendix B present time paths of two variables: the percentage of 
individuals with a work disability and the percentage of individuals working. For each of 
these variables we produce four values, according to the four scenarios sketched above.  
Let us first concentrate on work disability. The yellow and light blue lines 
represent the scenarios where the U.S. disability parameters are used (the yellow line) or 
where both the disability parameters and the work parameters come from the U.S. (the 
light blue line). The graphs suggest that the initial conditions only have an effect during 
the first couple of years of the simulations. The path of disability moves away from its 
initial position very quickly. 
 In countries where self-reported disability tends to be low, moving to U.S. 
parameters will lead to an increase in self-reported work disability. This is the case for  
female disability in Belgium, U.K., and the Southern European countries, and for 
disability among malesin the UK, Italy and Spain. In some other cases the simulations 
with U.S. parameters do not lead to very different time paths of disability, like for 
Belgian, Greek, and Portuguese males. In a number of countries, adopting U.S. 
parameters leads to a dramatic fall in disability. These cases include males and females in 
Germany and Finland, and females in Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Another noteworthy aspect of the graphs is that the light blue and yellow lines 
tend to be on top of each other for most countries. This suggests that the feedback from 
work to disability is quantitatively similar to that in the U.S. (since the yellow line uses 
country specific work parameters this should generate deviations from the all U.S. light 
blue line if work had an appreciably different effect on disability in Europe compared to 
the U.S.). Cases where the feedback from work to disability appears to make a difference 
include females in The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Austria. 
For males the difference in feedback from work to disability seems to be essentially 
immaterial, with the possible exception of Belgium. Inspecting the second column of 
Table A4, suggests that the cases with the biggest differences between the yellow and 
light blue lines are indeed the cases where the estimated values of 
D
W γ , the effect of 
lagged work on disability, deviate most from the U.S. estimate.   15
Now consider the bottom part of the graphs, i.e. the simulation of employment 
under the different scenarios.  The simulations with all U.S. coefficients lead to final 
values that are quite similar across countries: from 0.66 (Portugal) to 0.75 (Belgium, 
Ireland) for women, and from 0.76 (Germany) to 0.86 (several countries) for men. The 
main sources of differences are initial conditions and demographic and health differences. 
A second observation is that the simulation with all U.S. coefficients leads to the highest 
employment rate in almost all countries, although often it makes only a negligible 
difference whether European or US coefficients are used for the work disability equation. 
Exceptions are Italy and the UK where replacing EU disability coefficients by US 
coefficients leads to higher work disability and thus lowers employment. As a 
consequence, the highest employment rate is attained with US work and EU disability 
coefficients.  
This argument, however, does not always work: to further isolate the effect of 
labor market institutions from the effect of disability, it is of interest to consider the 
difference between the yellow line (only disability parameters from the U.S.) and the 
light blue line (all parameters from the U.S.) in more countries. It is instructive to take 
The Netherlands as an example. When looking at females, we note that the simulation 
with U.S. disability coefficients but Dutch work coefficients yields essentially the same 
employment rate, despite the fact that disability is much lower with U.S. disability 
coefficients. Table A4 tells us immediately why this is so. The parameter 
W
D γ  is close to 
zero for Dutch females. We also note however that the light blue line (all U.S. 
parameters) is about 25 percentage points higher than the yellow line. This suggests that 
independent of the disability status of Dutch women, American institutions would 
generate a much higher employment rate. The story for Dutch males is qualitatively 
similar, but since the employment rate is already high, adopting U.S. coefficients can 
only have a limited effect. With this example in mind we observe that in all countries, 
with the possible exception of Denmark, the U.K. and Ireland, labor market institutions, 
rather than disability, cause the employment rate to be low relative to the U.S.  
One can further investigate this by looking at the pink lines (EU disability 
parameters, but U.S. work parameters). The relevant comparison now is between the pink 
line and the dark blue line (all E.U. parameters). Once again we find that labor market   16
institutions explain the differences in employment rates, rather than differences in 
disability. 
A different way to obtain insight into the different dynamics across the various 
countries is to consider transition matrices. These are given in Table A5 (for disability) 
and Table A6 (for work). These key dynamics relate to the transitions between work and 
non-work and disability and non-disability. Each can be summarized by two off- diagonal 
transitions. For work, the two transitions are the transition from work to non-work and 
the transition from non-work to work. Similarly for disability the off-diagonal transitions 
are from not disabled to disabled and from disabled to not disabled. Since our interest 
concerns how all these transition patterns vary across our set of countries, Tables A7 (for 
disability) and A8 (for work) summarize the key parameters by organizing them by the 
magnitude of the transitions with the country names attached. Finally, since the U.S. will 
be the benchmark for all countries in our simulations we list the U.S. parameter at the 
bottom of each list.   
Consider first the disability transitions.  We observe considerable variation in the 
inflow rates into disability (the transition from being not disabled in one period to being 
disabled the next period). For men these rates vary from 18% in Germany to 4% in the 
U.S., U.K., and Italy. For women the rates vary from 21% in Germany to 5% in Ireland, 
Italy, and Belgium. The U.S. is near the bottom with 6%.  On the other hand outflow 
rates out of disability (the transition from being disabled in one period and not disabled in 
the next period) vary less, at least in relative terms. For men the rates vary from 42% in 
Italy to 23% in Germany and Denmark, while for women the rates vary from 49% in Italy 
to 22% in Germany.  
There are a number of salient patterns to these disability transitions. First, while 
the levels differ between men and women, the country rankings are remarkably similar by 
gender suggesting that the variation across countries is at least partly due to institutional 
variation affecting men and women in a similar way. To illustrate, Germany ranks 
highest on the transition into disability for both sexes while Italy ranks highest in the 
transition from work disability into non-work disability.  Second, for almost all the 
countries listed there exists considerable churning between work and non-work disability 
indicating that work disability is far from a permanent condition even at these older ages   17
(cf. Kapteyn, Smith and Van Soest, 2007). Consequently, cross-sectional analysis of 
work disability status will not be able to capture some of the main features of work 
disabilities during the pre-retirement years. Third, compared to the European countries, 
the U.S. ranks very low on the transition into work disability while it ranks in the middle 
of the pack in the transitions out of work disability.   
Work disability will tend to be high when the transition into work disability is high while 
the transition out of work disability is low. Germany, Denmark, and Finland would be the 
best prototypes of such behavior. On the other hand, other countries have a relatively low 
transition into disability matched with a relatively high transition out of disability. Italy, 
Greece, and Spain would be good illustrations of that behavior and in those countries the 
steady state levels of work disability will be low.  
Consider next the ranking of the transitions between work and non-work for 
countries listed in Table A8.  First, we note that the variation in transitions from work to 
non-work varies less across countries than the transitions from non-work to work. Thus 
most of the variation across countries in labor market dynamics relates to whether 
persons who are out of the labor force are likely to transit back into the labor force. To 
illustrate, for men, transition rates from non-work to work vary from 31% in the U.K. to 
as low as 3% in Austria and Belgium.  Indeed the countries where moving back into the 
labor force appears to be least likely, are very similar for men and women alike. These 
countries would include Italy, France, Belgium, and Austria.  
In contrast, the U.S. has a relatively high rate of transition back into the labor 
force for both sexes compared to all countries. It is in comparisons between the U.S. and 
Italy, France, Belgium, and Austria, that the effects on employment are quite dramatic. 
For example, the chart for Austria in Appendix B shows a very low employment rate 
towards the end of the observation period. For women, among the European countries the 
U.K. has the highest inflow into employment (16%), while Belgium has the lowest inflow 
(3%).  The chart for Belgium in Appendix B confirms that female employment in 
Belgium is very low in comparison with other countries. 
In sharp contrast, Table A8 shows much less variation in transitions from work to 
non-work especially for men. The full range of values for men in Table A8 is only from 
0.03 (Denmark) to 0.08 (Germany) with the U.S. at a value of 0.07.  In fact, eight of the   18
thirteen European countries in Table A8 for men lie within two percentage points of the 
U.S. transition value from work to not work.  Thus, the source of the labor market 
dynamic differences amongst these countries appears not to lie in the ease or difficulty of 
the transition from work to not-work. Instead, it is the relative rigidity of some European 
countries in discouraging re-entry into the labor force that appears to be the major issue.    
This is further illustrated by Table A9. The last four columns of Table A9 contain 
the same transition rates as Table A8, but in addition the first two columns contain 
measures of employment protection and replacement rates at retirement. The employment 
protection measure is taken from OECD (2004) and is the sum of three main components 
reflecting respectively (1) difficulty of dismissal, (2) procedural inconveniences an 
employer faces in the dismissal process, (3) severance pay provisions (OECD, 2004, p. 
65). The measure presented here is “version 2, late 1990s” (see Table 2.A2.4 in OECD, 
2004). The replacement rate shown in the table is the replacement rate of a worker with 
average earnings in a country, as calculated in OECD (2005). The countries in Table A9 
have been ranked according to the employment protection measure. Somewhat 
remarkably it is particularly the transitions from non-work to work that are affected by 
the employment protection index: for both women and men, more employment protection 
implies a smaller transition rate back into employment. A similar finding is reported in 
OECD (2004). On the other hand the protective effect seems to be limited; transition 
rates out of employment do not correlate significantly with the employment protection 
measure. 
In view of the age range we are considering, a measure of a retirement 
replacement rate has been included, since one would expect that some workers who are 
temporarily out of the labor force will transit into retirement rather than back into 
employment if that alternative is sufficiently attractive. Table A9 indeed shows the 
expected negative correlation. However, when regressing the transition rates on both the 
employment protection measure and the replacement rate measure we find the former to 
be significant, but not the latter. 
 
7. Conclusion  
   19
In this paper, we have investigated the dynamics of labor force and work 
disability behavior among individuals between 40 and 65 in several Western European 
countries and the United States.  We estimated the dynamics of labor force and disability 
behavior separately for men and women using high quality panel data in 13 European 
countries and the United States. We find substantial differences in labor force dynamics 
between the countries. Adopting U.S. parameters (i.e. U.S. institutions and norms) often 
leads to considerable reductions in self-reported disability. Although this has some effect 
on employment rates, most of the action is in the labor market institutions themselves, 
where adopting U.S. coefficients may generate substantially higher employment rates. 
Comparison of transition rates with aggregate measures of employment protection 
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Appendix A: Tables   22
Table A1.  Overview of ECHP waves   23
Table A2.  Selected characteristics of disability pension policies across countries 
 
Benefits 
Loss of earning capacity




>= 50% compared to 
person with the same 
education
60 months +1 month for each 
month from age 50) in the last 10 
years (plus 2 months for each 
month from age 50)
60% of assessment base (=average earnings in 
the best 16 years, up to an annual maximum of 
€3,013)
Belgium 2/3 in the usual occupation
6 months, incl. 120 days of 
actual/credited work 
65% of lost earnings (s.t. ceiling) for an insured 
w/ dependents; 40% if no dependents; 50% if 
no dependents but living w/ others with no 
income. Payable >1 year disability (1st year-
sickness benefit)
Denmark
Reduced working capacity & 
inability to assure 
subsistence
Disability pension & supplement 
(both income-tested) payable age 18-
64 w/ >=3 years' residence from 
age 15
13,895 kroner monthly for single, 11,810 kroner 
if not living alone; disability supplement 
(income test): 6,000 kroner a year
Finland
60% if earnings-related 
disability pension 
Universal disability pension 
(income-tested) - oermanent 
incapacity for suitable work
Universal dis.- Income tested €11.21 to €496.38 
a month; earnings-related disability: 1.5% of 
wage for each year of service up to disability 
onset
France
2/3 of earning capacity in 
any occupation under age 60
12 months insurance before 
disability onset and 800 hrs 
employment in lats 12 months
50% of average earnings in the best paid 
10 years if incapable of any professional activity, 
up to a maximum of €1,238 a month. Partial 
disability 30% of average earnings in best ys, 
min pension €241/month
Germany
Full reduction (can't work 
>3 hours/day in any form 
of employment) or partial 
reduction (can't work 
>6 hours/day in any form 
of employment)
5 years of contributions and 
36 months of compulsory 
contributions in the last 5 years
Total of individual earnings points (individual 
annual earnings divided by the average earnings 
of all contributors multiplied by the entry 
factor) multiplied by pension factor and 
pension value.
Greece  at least 80% disabled
max 4,500 days of contributions 
(1,500 days if the insured began 
working after 1993); 300 days if 
younger than 21
For an assessed degree of disability of 80% or 
more (severe), 100% of the pension is paid; for 
an assessed degree of disability of 67% to 
79.9% (ordinary), 75% of the pension paid; min 
pension €392.16/month.
Qualifiying conditions  24
Ireland
invalidity pension - 
permanent incapacity for 
work; disability allowance 
(means-tested): aged 16-66, 
physically/mentally disabled
260 weeks of paid contributions 
with 48 weeks paid or credited in 
the last tax year.
invalidity pension: €140.30 a week; €167.30 a 
week if aged 65 or older; disability allowance 
(means-tested): up to €134.80 a week, + €89.40 
a week for a qualified adult and €16.80 for each 
dependent child
Italy
Total and permanent 
inability to perform any 
work. 
5 years of contributions, including 3 
in the 5 years before the claim. No 
other forms of income, including 
earnings from self-employment and 
unemployment benefits
Pension based on a progressive percentage 
(0.9% to 2%) of salary multiplied by the 
number of years of contributions, up to a 
maximum of 40
Netherlands
at least 80% of earning 
capacity in the current 
occupation for full pension
Partial pension: The loss of 15% to 
80% of earning capacity for 
employed workers
Up to 70% of earnings for loss of earning 
capacity of at least 80%; 14% to 50.75% of 
earnings for a loss of earning capacity of 15% 
to 80%. €167.70 a day max
Portugal 2/3 of earning capacity  5 years of contributions (120 days 
of registered pay)
2% of average adjusted lifetime salary for each 
year of contributions 
Spain Loss of normal earning 
capacity
1/4 of period from age 20 to the 
onset of disability, with at least 
5 years of contributions and at least 
1/5 of the required contributions in 
the last 10 years
Permanent total disability, pension 100% of the 
benefit base ( min €411.76). For permanent 
occupational disability, award 55% of benefit 
base, plus 20% if aged 55+ & not employed 
(min €411.76).
Sweden
Work capacity reduced by at 
least one quarter
Earnings-related sickness 
compensation independent of 
insurance periods
94,320 kronor for an insured person with 
40 years of residence and without an earnings-
related benefit
Switzerland at least 40% disabled
contributions in all years from 
age 21. Special pension for 
nationals not meeting required min 
contribution period for disability 
base pension
9,146 francs a year plus a variable amount 
calculated by multiplying annual income by 
13/600 if income <37080
UK
Long-term incapacity 
benefit & disability living 
allowance (noncontributory, 
no means test)
3 years before the claim, age before 
65
Long-term incapacity benefit £72.15 a week, 
plus £43.15 a week for a dependent adult. 




Incapable of permanent 
substantial gainful activity; 
Disability supplemental 
income benefit (means-
tested): disabled & blind 
persons age <65 low 
income 
Quarter of coverage for each year 
since age 21 up to the year of the 
onset of disability, up to a 
maximum of 40 quarters of 
coverage, 20 quarters of coverage in 
the 10-year period 
pension based on the average covered earnings 
since 1950 (or age 21, if later) and indexed for 
past wage inflation, up to the onset of disability, 
excluding up to 5 years with the lowest 
earnings.
max monthly pension $2,036 (certain 
conditions)
Source: SSA, Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe, 2004
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2004-2005/europe/   2 5
Table A3. Disability benefits in OECD countries: Men, Late 1990s
% of disability 
benefit recipients 
declaring that 
they are not 
disabled
% of disabled 
persons ages 20-64 
with neither 
income from work 
nor income from 
benefits

























Austria 27,7 14,2 1,04 0,60 0,97 1,96
Germany n/a 11,9 1,25 0,67 0,92 1,79
Sweden 48,9 1,1 n/a 0,69 0,70 1,37
Netherlands 30,6 19,5 3,34 0,60 0,87 1,45
Spain 18,3 28,0 0,57 0,41 0,86 2,07
Italy 43,9 28,8 n/a 0,60 0,94 1,94
Portugal 28,6 20,9 0,97 0,59 n/a 1,81
France 33,3 11,7 n/a 0,72 n/a 1,83
Denmark 26,2 6,3 n/a 0,61 0,88 1,38
UK 43,3 9,1 5,64 0,53 0,84 1,61
US 46,7 18,8 1,16 0,58 0,71 2,84
Switzerland 29,8 14,2 n/a 0,79 0,98 n/a
Belgium 43,4 16,2 n/a 0,54 0,90 1,91
n/a - data not available
Source: OECD (2003a, Chapter 3, Tables 3.7 and 3.8)
These tables are summaries of more detailed information in OECD (2003b). 
The underlying data sources are ECHP 1996 or 1997 for the European countries and SIPP for the U.S.  26
 
 
Table A4. Work disability and employment dynamics: Key parameter estimates 
 
    Disability Equation  Work Equation 
   Lagged  Lagged  Lagged Lagged  Current 
   DisabilityEmployment Disability Employment  Disability 
  
D
D γ  
D
W γ  
W
D γ  
W
W γ  
W
D δ  
Germany  Men  0.725  -0.422  -0.432 1.973 -0.200 
  Women  0.572  -0.244  -0.285 1.356 -0.143 
Denmark  Men  1.011  -0.763  -0.587 1.841 -0.575 
  Women  0.780  -0.743  -0.559 1.826 -0.497 
Netherlands  Men  0.842  -0.789  -0.236 2.007 -0.762 
  Women  0.854   0.041  -0.068 1.516 -0.095 
Belgium  Men  1.225   0.231  -0.193 3.105 -0.211 
  Women  0.983  -1.344  -0.500 2.452 -1.221 
France  Men  0.814  -0.348  -0.234 2.541 -0.306 
  Women  0.875  -0.446  -0.184 2.495 -0.139 
UK  Men  1.153  -0.249  -0.037 1.541 -0.157 
 Women  0.835  -0.244  -0.075  1.418  0.037 
Ireland  Men  0.948  -0.728  -0.197 2.034 -0.670 
  Women  1.133 -0.03 -0.073 1.723 -0.532 
Italy  Men  1.023  -0.315  -0.198 2.093 -0.403 
  Women  0.683   0.011   0.012  1.725  -0.076 
Greece Men  0.935 -0.255  0.165  2.063  -0.411 
  Women  0.931  -0.122  -0.021 1.510 -0.161 
Spain  Men  0.738  -0.665  -0.650 1.701 -0.541 
  Women  0.749  -0.147  -0.239 1.175 -0.416 
Portugal Men  1.021  -0.104  0.127  2.316  -0.459 
  Women  0.958  -0.097  -0.108 1.920 -0.110 
Austria  Men  0.758  -0.437  -0.375 2.863 -0.444 
  Women  0.936  -0.266  -0.413 2.213 -0.199 
Finland  Men  0.977  -0.348  -0.284 1.765 -0.284 
  Women  0.978  -0.038  -0.363 1.403 -0.524 
U.S.  Men  1.064  -0.643  -0.308 1.643 -0.995 
  Women  0.841  -0.558  -0.202 1.447 -0.778 
 
Notes to table A4: 
Results for the U.S. are coefficients on one-year lagged variables although two-year lags are also included 
to control for the varying periodicity of PSID data. All specifications also include year dummies, controls 
for education, age group, marital status, self-reported general health status, and (in the U.S. case) 
ethnicity. Equations for the initial conditions use the same variable.    27
Table A5. Transition Probabilities  
for Disability Status 
Actual 
 Men  Women 
  Not Disabled  Disabled          Not Disabled                 Disabled 
Germany 
Not Disabled  0.82  0.18  0.79  0.21 





Not Disabled  0.82  0.12  0.88  0.12 
Disabled 0.23  0.77  0.28  0.72 
 
Netherlands 
Not Disabled  0.92  0.08  0.89  0.11 
Disabled 0.29  0.71  0.26  0.74 
 
Belgium 
Not Disabled  0.95  0.05  0.95  0.05 
Disabled 0.34  0.66  0.29  0.71 
 
France 
Not Disabled  0.91  0.09  0.90  0.10 
Disabled 0.31  0.69  0.30  0.70 
 
UK 
Not Disabled  0.96  0.04  0.93  0.07 
Disabled 0.26  0.74  0.31  0.69 
 
Ireland 
Not Disabled  0.93  0.07  0.95  0.05 
Disabled 0.31  0.69  0.34  0.65 
 
Italy  
Not Disabled  0.96  0.04  0.95  0.05 
Disabled 0.42  0.58  0.49  0.51 
 
Greece  
Not Disabled  0.94  0.06  0.93  0.07 
Disabled 0.37  0.63  0.37  0.63 
 
Spain  
Not Disabled  0.93  0.07  0.91  0.09 
Disabled 0.37  0.63  0.40  0.60 
 
Portugal  
Not Disabled  0.92  0.08  0.90  0.10 
Disabled 0.28  0.72  0.27  0.74   28
 
Austria  
Not Disabled  0.91  0.09  0.91  0.09 
Disabled 0.35  0.65  0.36  0.64 
 
Finland  
Not Disabled  0.88  0.12  0.87  0.13 
Disabled 0.25  0.75  0.26  0.74 
 
United States   
Not Disabled  0.96  0.04  0.94  0.06 
Disabled 0.26  0.74  0.29  0.71 
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Table A6. Transition Probabilities  
for Labor Force Status 
Actual 
 Men  Women 
 Doesn't  work  Works  Doesn't work  Works 
Germany 
Doesn't work  0.89  0.11  0.91  0.09 
Works 0.08  0.92  0.10  0.90 
 
Denmark 
Doesn't work  0.84  0.16  0.86  0.14 
Works 0.03  0.97  0.06  0.94 
 
Netherlands 
Doesn't work  0.86  0.14  0.92  0.08 
Works 0.04  0.96  0.09  0.91 
 
Belgium 
Doesn't work  0.97  0.03  0.97  0.03 
Works 0.04  0.96  0.07  0.93 
 
France 
Doesn't work  0.92  0.08  0.94  0.05 
Works 0.05  0.95  0.06  0.93 
 
UK 
Doesn't work  0.69  0.31  0.84  0.16 
Works 0.06  0.94  0.10  0.90 
 
Ireland 
Doesn't work  0.87  0.13  0.93  0.07 
Works 0.04  0.96  0.11  0.89 
 
Italy  
Doesn't work  0.91  0.09  0.97  0.03 
Works 0.07  0.93  0.10  0.90 
 
Greece  
Doesn't work  0.88  0.12  0.94  0.07 
Works 0.05  0.95  0.15  0.85 
 
Spain  
Doesn't work  0.85  0.15  0.94  0.06 
Works 0.07  0.93  0.14  0.86 
 
Portugal  
Doesn't work  0.89  0.12  0.92  0.08 
Works 0.04  0.96  0.09  0.91   30
 
Austria  
Doesn't work  0.97  0.03  0.96  0.04 
Works 0.07  0.93  0.09  0.91 
 
Finland  
Doesn't work  0.87  0.13  0.87  0.13 
Works 0.06  0.94  0.07  0.93 
 
United States   
Doesn't work  0.80  0.20  0.74  0.2603 
Works 0.07  0.93  0.037  0.97 
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Table A7. 
 
Ordering of Transitions in Disability States by Country 
 
A.  Not Disabled to Disabled 
  Men Women 
  Transition Countries  Transition Countries 
  .18 Germany  .21 Germany 
  .12 Denmark,  Finland   .13 Finland 
  .09 France,  Austria  .12 Denmark 
  .08 Netherlands,  Portugal    .11 Netherlands 
  .07 Ireland,  Spain  .10 France,  Portugal 
  .06 Greece  .09 Austria,  Spain 
  .05 Belgium  .07 Greece,  UK 
  .04  Italy, UK  .05  Belgium, Ireland, Italy 
    U.S. = .04    U.S. = .06 
 
B.  Disabled to Not Disabled                         
 Men  Women 
  Transition Countries  Transition Countries 
  .42 Italy  .49 Italy 
  .37 Greece,  Spain  .40 Spain 
  .35 Austria  .37 Greece 
  .34 Belgium  .36 Austria 
  .31 France,  Ireland  .34 Ireland 
  .29 Netherlands  .31 UK 
  .28 Portugal  .30 France 
  .26 UK  .29 Belgium 
  .25 Finland  .28 Denmark 
  .23 Germany,  Denmark  .27 Portugal 
     .26  Netherlands,  Finland 
     .22  Germany 
    U.S. = .26    U.S. = .29 
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Table A8 
 
Ordering of Work Transitions by Country 
 
A.  Work to Not Work 
  Men Women 
  Transition Countries  Transition Countries 
  .08 Germany  .15 Greece 
  .07 Italy,  Spain,  Austria    .14 Spain 
  .06 UK,  Finland  .11 Ireland 
  .05 France,  Greece    .10 Germany,  UK,  Italy 
  .04  Netherlands, Belgium  .09  Netherlands, Portugal, Austria 
    Ireland, Portugal  .07  Belgium, Finland 
  .03 Denmark  .06 Denmark,  France 
    U.S. = .07    U.S. = .04 
 
B.  Not Work to Work 
 Men  Women 
  Transition Countries  Transition Countries 
 .31  UK 
  .16 Denmark  .16 UK 
  .15 Spain  .14 Denmark 
  .14 Netherlands  .13 Finland 
  .13 Ireland,  Finland  .09 Germany 
  .12 Greece,  Portugal  .08 Portugal,  Netherlands 
  .11 Germany  .07 Ireland,  Greece 
  .09 Italy  .06 Spain 
  .08 France  .05 France 
  .03 Belgium,  Austria  .04 Austria 
     .03  Belgium,  Italy 
    U.S. = .20    U.S. = .26 
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Table A9: Transition rates, employment protection, and retirement replacement 
rates 
     Men  Women 
 
OECD 
employment replacement  work  to 
not 







work  to work  not work  to work 
Portugal 3.7  79.8  0.04  0.12  0.09  0.08 
Greece 3.5  99.9  0.05  0.12  0.15  0.07 
Italy 3.1  88.8  0.07  0.09  0.1  0.03 
Spain 3  88.3  0.07  0.15  0.14  0.06 
France 2.8  68.8  0.05  0.08  0.06  0.05 
Germany 2.6  71.8  0.08  0.11  0.1  0.09 
Belgium 2.5  63.1  0.04  0.03  0.07  0.03 
Austria 2.4  93.2  0.07  0.03  0.09  0.04 
Netherlands 2.3  84.1  0.04  0.14  0.09  0.08 
Finland 2.2  78.8  0.06  0.13  0.07  0.13 
Denmark 1.8  54.1  0.03  0.16  0.06  0.14 
Ireland 1.2  36.6  0.04  0.13  0.11  0.07 
UK 1  47.6  0.06  0.31  0.1  0.16 
U.S. 0.7  51  0.07  0.2  0.04  0.26 
correlation with    0.81  -0.02  -0.57  0.45  -0.7 
OECD 
measure*   [.001]  [.96]  [.03]  [.10]  [.005] 
correlation with      0.28  -0.46  0.46  -0.5 
replacement rate*    [.32]  [.09]  [.10]  [.07] 
* Significance level in square 
brackets         













Appendix B: Simulated Time Paths of Mild and Severe Disability and of Labor 
Force Status   35
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